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Abstract—With the development of information technology 
and the Internet, recommendation systems have become an 
important means to solve the problem of information overload. 
However, recommendation system is greatly fragile as it relies 
heavily on behavior data of users, which makes it very easy for a 
host of malicious merchants to inject shilling attacks in order to 
manipulate the recommendation results. Some papers on shilling 
attack have proposed the detection methods, whether based on 
false user profiles or abnormal items, but their detection rate, false 
alarm rate, universality, and time overhead need to be further 
improved. In this paper, we propose a new item anomaly detection 
method, through T-distribution technology based on Dynamic 
Time Intervals. First of all, based on the characteristics of shilling 
attack quickness (Attackers inject a large number of fake profiles 
in a short period in order to save costs), we use dynamic time 
interval method to divide the rating history of item into multiple 
time windows. Then, we use the T-distribution to detect the 
exception windows. By conducting extensive experiments on a 
dataset that accords with real-life situations and comparing it to 
currently outstanding methods, our proposed approach has a 
higher detection rate, lower false alarm rate and smaller time 
overhead to the different attack models and filler sizes.  
Keywords—Recommendation System, Shilling Attack, T-
distribution, Dynamic Time Intervals. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
So far, the recommendation systems have been widely used 
on various e-commerce websites, such as the Amazon 
personalized product recommendation, Google Reader’s 
individuation reading and all kinds of personalized advertising, 
etc. The recommendation systems [1] can contact the user and 
information. On the one hand, it helps users find information that 
they’re interested in. On the other hand, it enables information 
to be displayed in front of users who are interested in this 
information. Recommendation systems help users get rid of the 
trouble of information overload, but it heavily depends on users' 
historical records, rating records, and other external historical 
behaviors, etc. Some malicious merchants pour into a large 
amount of biased user rating profiles in the recommendation 
systems for their own benefits [2-6], with the purpose of 
changing the recommending results for their own profits. As a 
result of, the recommendation results become inaccurate, which 
adversely affect the reputation of the recommendation systems. 
Above user rating profile is called shilling attack profile, and this 
malicious businessman is called a shilling attacker.  
The growing number of businessmen has been disturbing the 
recommendation results. And they get great results with very 
little effort. This seriously affects the stability and accuracy of 
the recommendation systems. To solve the problem, Zhang et al. 
[15] proposed constructing a time series of rating in order to 
detect abnormal profiles according to sample average and 
sample entropy in each window. Additionally, Gao et al. 
propose two abnormal profiles detection methods, the former is 
based on fixed time intervals, and the latter adopts a dynamic 
partitioning method for time series. Although they have made 
progress, the satisfaction of detection rate, false alarm rate and 
time overhead remains challenging. 
In order to solve this issue, this paper proposes T-distribution 
[8] on the Dynamic Time Intervals, which can solve these 
problems well through lots of experiments. We summarize the 
contributions as follows:  
• We use the dynamic time intervals method that takes 
advantage of the quickness of the shilling attack to 
effectively divide the attack profiles into one window. 
• We introduce T-distribution method whose characteristic 
is the smaller sample and stronger detection ability in 
order to accurately detect abnormal windows.  
The rest sections of the paper are distributed as follows. The 
second part introduces the common attack models and 
traditional detection methods. In the third part, we mainly 
introduce the background knowledge of T-distribution and some 
problem definitions to facilitate our system. In the fourth part, 
we detail the method proposed in this paper. And in the fifth part, 
as the experimental part, we give the evaluation of MovieLens 
dataset. Finally, we summarize in the sixth part. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The shilling attack [7] main includes push attacks and nuke 
attacks. The push attacks can enable the recommendation 
systems to make it easier to recommend target items, and the 
nuke attacks are to make it more difficult to recommend target 
items. To avoid being detected, many attack models have been 
introduced to disguise themselves [2]. Several common attack 
models are proposed here. Attack profiles contain filler items, 
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selected items, unrated items and target item(s). Selected items 
are based on specific needs of the spam user, filler items are a 
set of randomly selected items to fake normal users, unrated 
items are those items with no ratings in the profiles, and target 
items are the items that attackers attempt to promote or demote. 
The selected items and filler items strengthened the power of the 
shilling attack, and the attack profile is shown in the Fig. 1. 
These basic elements in the Fig. 1. make up different types 
of attack models. The three most common attack models are 
random attack, average attack, and popular attack. Random 
attack is to randomly select some items from the system for 
random ratings. Its advantage is that requires little cost but gains 
great benefits. Average attack is that items of random attack are 
assigned the corresponding average ratings, and in the literature 
[5], Burke et al. find this attack model win the advantages over 
the random attack. Popular attack is an extension of random 
attack, on this basis, the most popular item in the field is selected 
to have the highest rating. The model structure is shown in the 
table I. In addition, in order to avoid detection, the attacker also 
adds obfuscated attack, which is more difficult to detect [10,11]. 
 
Fig. 1. The general of form of a shilling attack profile 
TABLE I.  THREE CLASSICAL ATTACK MODELS 
Attack Type Push Attack 
Random 𝐼𝑆 = , 𝐼𝐹 = 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛 , 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 
Average 𝐼𝑆 = , 𝐼𝐹 = 𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑔, 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 
Bandwagon 𝐼𝑆 = 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝐼𝐹 = 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛 , 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 
Attack Type Nuke Attack 
Random 𝐼𝑆 = , 𝐼𝐹 = 𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑛 , 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 
Average 𝐼𝑆 = , 𝐼𝐹 = 𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑛 , 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 
Bandwagon 𝐼𝑆 = 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝐼𝐹 = 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛, 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 
 
The early detection methods include supervised learning and 
unsupervised learning technologies [12, 13]. No matter where 
there are methods, they are all aimed at analyzing the features of 
user profiles. For examples, Williams et al. [13] proposed a kind 
of supervised learning method through extracting a series of the 
user profile characteristics, including Rating Deviation from 
Mean Agreement (RDMA), Length Variance (LengthVar), 
Degree of Similarity with Top Neighbors (DegSim), and then 
examine attack profiles by the supervised learning algorithm. 
However, this method only makes effort to a specific type of 
attack model and has not universality. Bryan et al. [14] proposed 
an Unsupervised Retrieval of Attack Profiles algorithm 
(UnRAP), which found attacks could readily be identified by 
biclustering, so an unsupervised algorithm of introducing Hv-
score values is proposed to detect Attack profiles. This method 
wins the advantages to be able to detect different Attack model. 
Wu et al.[17] put forward the semi-supervised learning Attack 
detection algorithm (Semi-SAD), which combines supervised 
learning with unsupervised learning and combines Naïve Bayes 
with EM-𝜆  algorithm to detect attack profiles by optimizing 
parameters 𝜆. But all of the above methods have high calculation 
cost and don’t have good detection rates. 
Zhang et al. [15] and Gao et al. [9, 16] analyzed the changes 
in the target item, which reduced the calculation engineering and 
improved the universality and accuracy. Zhang et al. proposed a 
time series detection method based on the sample mean and 
sample entropy according to the rapidity and purpose of the 
attacker. However, the time window of this method is fixed, and 
different time Window sizes have diverse detection effect. Gao 
et al. proposed dynamic partitioning for time series based on 
significant points, and then used 𝜒2  to identify item-rating 
abnormal time window. However, 𝜒2 heavily depended on the 
population variance, and with dynamically divided time 
intervals, every item-rating sample of time intervals has 
different sparsity and density. Although the more samples there 
are, the more obvious the detection effect will be, however, in 
the time window of small samples, the detection efficiency is 
often not obvious. Therefore, we propose a T-distribution 
detection based on the Dynamic Time Intervals method to solve 
this problem more accurately. 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
T-distribution was first proposed by William Sealy Gosset in 
1908. T-distribution is dramatically significant in Statistics 
researches, in order to tackle several practical problems through 
Interval Estimation and Hypothesis Testing [18], which has 
significant applications in the medical domain to detect blood 
quality problems. The shape of the T-distribution curve is 
related to the degree of freedom 𝑣, which is related to the sample 
size 𝑛. Compared with the standard normal distribution curve, 
the smaller the number of samples is, the smaller the degree of 
freedom 𝑣 is, the flatter the T-distribution curve is, the lower the 
middle of the curve is, and the higher the tail of the curve is, 
oppositely, the higher the degree of the sample is, the closer the 
T-distribution curve is to the positive distribution curve. When 
the degree of freedom 𝑣  is infinite, the curve of the T-
distribution is the standard positive distribution curve. That is to 
say, This feature of the T-distribution is significant for us to 
detect samples injected with a small number of attacks. 
In order to facilitate our system, we have the following 
notations and definitions: 
• 𝐼: the set of the entire items. 
• 𝑈: the set of the entire users. 
• 𝐻′: the set of the rating actions. Specifically, each rating 
action ℎ ∈ 𝐻′  is represented as ℎ =<
ℎ. 𝑖, ℎ. 𝑢, ℎ. 𝑟, ℎ. 𝑡 > , where ℎ. 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼  refers to an item, 
ℎ. 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 denotes the user that gives ℎ. 𝑖 a rating, ℎ. 𝑟 is 
the rating, and ℎ. 𝑡 is the time of rating. 
Definition 1 (Rating History).  For each item 𝑖𝑘 ∈ 𝐼 , a 
rating history 𝐻𝑘  of item 𝑖𝑘  is a sequence of rating records 
formatted as 𝐻𝑘 = ℎ1
ℎ2.𝑡−ℎ1.𝑡
→      ℎ2
ℎ3.𝑡−ℎ2.𝑡
→      …
ℎ𝑛.𝑡−ℎ𝑛−1.𝑡
→        ℎ𝑛 , 
where ℎ𝑗 ∈ 𝐻
′ , 0 < 𝑗 < 𝑛 ,  ℎ𝑗+1. 𝑡 > ℎ𝑗 . 𝑡 , and ∄ℎ𝑗′ ∈ 𝐻
′ ,  
𝑠. 𝑡.  ℎ𝑗 . 𝑡 < ℎ𝑗′. 𝑡 < ℎ𝑗+1. 𝑡. 
Definition 2 (Item-ratings Time Gaps Series). For each 
rating history 𝐻𝑘 , a item-ratings time gaps series is 
𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐺𝑆𝑘 ={(𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇1 ,  𝑔𝑎𝑝1 ),…,(𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇𝑛−1 ,𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑛−1 )}, 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇𝑗 =
(ℎ𝑗+1. 𝑡 − ℎ𝑗 . 𝑡)/2 , refers to the median of the adjacent 
timestamps between ratings, and 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑗 = ℎ𝑗+1. 𝑡 − ℎ𝑗 . 𝑡, refers 
to the adjacent timestamps gap between ratings. 
Definition 3 (Time Window). Suppose 𝐻𝑘 is divided into m 
time intervals, time window series of 𝐻𝑘  is 𝑊𝑘 =
{𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑚}, each time window 𝑤𝑥 ∈ 𝑊𝑘 corresponds to all 
ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑘 of the 𝑥th time interval. Besides, 𝑤1 ∪ 𝑤2 ∪ …∪ 𝑤𝑚 =
𝐻𝑘, 𝑤1 ∩ 𝑤2 ∩ …∩ 𝑤𝑚 = ∅. 
Definition 4 (Window Size). For each time window 𝑤𝑥 ∈
𝑊𝑘 , a window size of 𝑤𝑥  is 𝑤𝑠𝑥  that refers to the amount of 
containing all h in 𝑤𝑥 . For example, Suppose ℎ𝑗 ∈ 𝐻𝑘  and 
 𝑤𝑥 = {ℎ𝑗 , ℎ𝑗+1, … , ℎ𝑗+𝑧}, window size of 𝑤𝑥 : 𝑤𝑠𝑥 = 𝑧. 
IV. T-DISTRIBUTION TO DETECT ATTACKS ON THE DYNAMIC 
TIME INTERVALS METHOD 
In order to gain more benefits, attackers inject a large 
number of high ratings (push attack) and low ratings (nuke 
attack) into the target item in a fast time to make the 
recommendation system easier or harder to recommend the item. 
Therefore, a common characteristic of all attack models is that a 
large number of attack profiles will be injected into the target 
item in a small time interval. That is to say, high ratings or low 
ratings and the number of rating will be significantly increased 
or drastically decreased in the attack time interval. According to 
the features of shilling attack mentioned above, we propose 
TDTI (T-distribution to Detect Attacks on the Dynamic Time 
Intervals) method.  
Our method is mainly based on two features of the attack as 
preconditions: 1) Attackers inject a large number of fake profiles 
in a short period in order to save costs, and attacks must be very 
dense. 2)   Incidence rate of injection periods must be tiny time 
intervals throughout entire lifecycle of the item.  
The general idea of the proposed method is as follows: 
Firstly, we divide the rating history of item into time windows 
by using the algorithm of DTI (Dynamic Time Intervals). And 
then, through the T-distribution algorithm, we calculate the T-
value between each time window and other time windows of the 
rating history in order to determine suspicious time windows 
that are different from others in the rating history. To be more 
precise, through analyzed the timestamp gaps of time windows, 
we obtain abnormal windows. Finally, we calculate the mean of 
ratings in the abnormal window, exclude the ratings less than the 
mean (push) or the ratings more than the mean (nuke), and the 
rest is the abnormal ratings of the attacks.  
In this section, we will introduce our TDTI method in detail, 
divided into two modules: 1) designing the DTI algorithm 
partitioning rating history of item into time window series. 2) T-
distribution algorithm identifies abnormal windows. 
A. Designing the DTI algorithm partitioning rating history. 
 We aim to partition the rating history of item into multiple 
time windows, and ensure that the attack profiles are divided 
into one time window in the same period. Based on feature1: a 
large number of attacks are injected system in a short period, the 
specific steps are as follows: 
1) According to the rating history of item, we calculate the 
corresponding IRTGS (Item-ratings Time Gaps Series). 
2) Divide IRTGS into two subsequences according to the 
maximum value of 𝑔𝑎𝑝 and the correspond 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇. 
3) Repeat step2 for the two subsequences again, and record 
the 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇  value as mark point, until the difference between 
maximum and minimum of 𝐺𝑎𝑝 is less than 𝛼. In order to make 
the implementation efficiency high, we set 𝛽  value, if the 
length of IRTGS is less than 𝛽 value , the circulation ends. This 
is mainly because of the rapidity of the shilling attack, with very 
intensive rating at very small intervals, so the 𝛼 value cannot be 
too large, otherwise the normal rating will be integrated into the 
abnormal window with a large number of attacks. Meanwhile 
also cannot be too small, otherwise, the attack profiles will be 
divided into multiple windows. The 𝛼 value is related to the 
rating characteristic, and 𝛼 value is obtained by a large number 
of experimental tests. 
4) Divide the rating history of item based on the mark 
points recorded by step3. 
Algorithm 1 describes the process of DTI. Lines 1 and 2 
correspond to step1, and lines 3 to 12 correspond to step2 and 
step3. Lines 12 and 13 correspond to step4.  
 
Algorithm 1: DTI partitions rating history 
Input: the rating history of item: 𝐻{ℎ1, … , ℎ𝑖 , … , ℎ𝑛} , 
threshold values 𝛼 and 𝛽 
Output: all time windows of item 𝑊{𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑚} 
1: for 𝑖 from 0 to 𝑛 − 1: 
2:     get 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇𝑖  
3: Constructing 𝐝𝐭𝐢 (𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇): 
4:     if (𝑔𝑎𝑝. length > 𝛽 and  
                𝑔𝑎𝑝.max − 𝑔𝑎𝑝.min > 𝛼): 
5:         𝑚 = 𝑔𝑎𝑝.max. location. 
6:         gap_𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 =  𝑔𝑎𝑝[0:𝑚] 
7:         gap_𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 =  𝑔𝑎𝑝 [𝑚 +  1: 𝑔𝑎𝑝. length] 
8:         𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇 does the same thing 
9:         𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘. append(𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇[𝑚]) 
10:       𝐝𝐭𝐢(gap_𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇_𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡) 
11:       𝐝𝐭𝐢(gap_𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑇_𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) 
12: sort (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘) group 𝐻  
13: get 𝑊 
 
TABLE II.  THE FREEDOM CORRESPONDS TO BOUNDARY VALUE IN THE 95% CONFIDENCE LEVEL 
Freedom 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Boundary value 12.71 4.303 3.182 2.776 2.571 2.447 2.365 2.306 
 The above step is the DTI to divide the rating history into 
multiple time windows. For example, In order to illustrate our 
method more clearly, we randomly selected an item from 
MovieLens 100k dataset. The IRTGS of original data of the item 
is shown in Fig. 2. A large number of attack profiles are injected 
in a short time in Fig. 3 and here we injected 50 attack profiles 
to show clear result, where a host of attack profiles are shown in 
the red circle mark in which the smaller image in the middle of 
Fig. 3 is zoomed. Fig. 4 shows the mark points are recorded by 
the method of dynamically dividing IRTGS. We record the 
horizontal coordinates corresponding to the red vertical line as 
mark point set in order to divide the rating history. Fig. 5 shows 
the cutting of rating history based on the mark point. Obviously, 
according to mark point set divides the rating history into time 
window series, and attacks are divided into a time window, 
which contains tiny normal profiles. 
B. T-distribution algorithm Identifies Abnormal Windows. 
After The abnormal windows are detected by the following 
steps: 
1) Calculate the T value of each time window and other 
Windows to determine whether each window is consistent with 
the properties of others. 
2) Compare the relationship between each T value and its 
corresponding boundary value. If the value beyond the 
boundary value is denoted as 1 (inconsistent), and if it is 
denoted as 0  within the boundary value range (consistent). 
Sequentially, we obtain a 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 − 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 
Symmetric Matrix , where its values only have 0 or 1, so in this 
paper, we call it 0 − 1 Matrix. 
3) Analyze the 0 − 1 Matrix, and we select the windows 
whose 1 value quantities are more than the mean of 1 value 
quantities of all windows in rating history to get suspicious 
window set. Based on the shilling attack characteristics of 1 
(Attackers inject a host of false profiles in a short period) and 
2(Incidence rate of injection periods must be tiny time intervals 
throughout entire lifecycle of the item.), abnormal window 
must be a minority, and the case that the windows get 1 value 
is more than the normal windows, Thus, we can easily get 
suspicious windows by comparing the number of 1 value in 
each window to the mean.  
4) Compare each window in the suspicious window set 
obtained in step 3, if time gap of the window is greater than the 
mean time gaps of all time windows in the rating history and 
the rating number of the window is smaller than the mean rating 
quantities of all Windows in the rating history. Based on the 
attack characteristics of 1 (rapidity), we reasoned that each 
timestamp gap of abnormal window is smaller than timestamp 
gaps of normal windows and each rating quantity of abnormal 
window is more than normal windows. Through this condition, 
we get the attack windows.  
The T value was calculated by the modified two-sample T-
distribution hypothesis testing method[18]. The formula applied 
to the procedures is as follows: 
 𝑥 𝑖
∗
=
1
𝑚
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1    (1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 5)                       () 
  𝑥 𝑗
∗
=
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1    (1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 5)                         () 
The formula (1) and (2) are functions of the means in time 
window.   𝑥 𝑖
∗
 is the modified mean of the 𝑖th time window 
and 𝑥 𝑗
∗
 represents modified mean of the 𝑗th  time window. 
Since the score range is from 1 to 5 in this context, the max rating 
difference is 5, leading to that the different between the rating 
mean of time windows can only be within the range of 5 and the 
calculation of T value is related to the difference, which is no 
obvious effect. In order to increase the difference, we improve 
the function through the 𝑚 in formula (1) and 𝑛 in formula (2), 
refer to the number of rating kinds rather than the number of 
ratings, so that we can realize the more the rating number and 
the larger the difference change of rating mean.  𝑥𝑖𝑘  in formula 
(1) refers to the 𝑘th rating in the 𝑖 window and 𝑥𝑗𝑘  in formula (2) 
is the 𝑘th rating in the 𝑗 window.             
 𝑥𝑖 =
𝑚
𝑔
 𝑥 𝑖
∗
                                     (3) 
 𝑥𝑗 =
𝑛
ℎ
 𝑥 𝑗
∗
                                      (4) 
The formula (3) is conversion function of modified mean 
( 𝑥 𝑖
∗
) and traditional mean ( 𝑥𝑖 ), and formula (4) shows 
relationship between modified mean (  𝑥 𝑗
∗
) and traditional 
mean ( 𝑥𝑗 ), where 𝑔 and ℎ refers to the number of rating in the 
𝑖th and 𝑗th time windows. 
  𝑠𝑖
2 =
1
𝑔
∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑘 −  𝑥 𝑖)
2𝑔
𝑘=1                       (5) 
                          𝑠𝑗
2 =
1
ℎ
∑ (𝑥𝑗𝑘 −  𝑥 𝑗)
2ℎ
𝑘=1                       (6) 
The formula (5) and (6) are variances of time window. 
 
   
Fig. 2. IRTGS of Non-Attacks Fig. 3. IRTGS of Attacks Fig. 4. recording point marks  Fig. 5. cutting rating history 
𝑇𝑖𝑗 =
 𝑥 𝑖
∗
− 𝑥 𝑗
∗
−(𝑎0−𝑎𝑖)
√𝑔𝑠𝑖
2+ℎ𝑠𝑗
2
√
𝑚𝑛(𝑚+𝑛−2)
𝑚+𝑛
~𝑡(𝑚 + 𝑛 − 2)  (7) 
T value can be expressed as formula (7), where 𝑎0 refers to 
the rating mean in entire rating history, and 𝑎𝑖 refers to the rating 
mean of rating history excluding the 𝑖th window. 𝑚 + 𝑛 − 2 is 
the freedom about T value, which corresponds to the boundary 
value, shown as Table II. If the freedom is 0, it means that the 
rating type of both windows is 1, in this case, we default to 
similar attributes of the two windows. 
Algorithm 2 describes the process that T-distribution detects 
abnormal windows, where lines 1 to 8 correspond to step1, lines 
9 to 11 correspond to step2, and lines 12 to 17 correspond to 
step3 and step4. 
Subsequently, we take the item selected in the A subsection 
as an example. Table III shows the value matrix 𝑇𝑖𝑗  through T-
distribution procedure obtained. And then, compare each T 
value with the corresponding boundary value to obtain the 
matrix 0 − 1 in table IV, As can be seen from the table III, the 
third window far exceeds the boundary value. 
TABLE III.  T𝑖𝑗 VALUE MATRIX OBTAINED THROUGH OUR PROCEDURE 
𝑻𝒊𝒋 1 2 3 4 
1 0 2.534 53.013 0.157 
2 2.683 0 50.833 2.43 
3 52.195 49.962 0 52.132 
4 0.307 2.348 53.008 0 
 
TABLE IV.  T𝑖𝑗 VALUE MATRIX OBTAINED THROUGH OUR PROCEDURE 
𝑻𝒊𝒋 1 2 3 4 
1 0 0 1 0 
2 0 0 1 0 
3 1 1 0 1 
4 0 0 1 0 
 
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
A. Datasets 
In the experiments, we use public available dataset 
MovieLens 100k, which has been collected by GroupLens 
Research and made available from the GroupLens web site. 
MovieLens is a recommendation system; Its main function is to 
make recommendations based on user preferences and the 
widely used technology is collaborative filtering. The dataset 
contains 1682 items, 100000 ratings that were evaluated by 943 
users. Each user makes at least 20 ratings, and rating has five 
ranks from 1 to 5. To facilitate our experiment, we omitted the 
items with less than 10 rating quantities, because the number of 
rating was too small to reflect the authenticity of the experiment, 
and the dataset after filtering is shown in the table V. 
TABLE V.  MAINLY INFORMATION OF THE DATASET IN THE EXPERIMENT 
Dataset Item User Rating 
MovieLens 100K 1152 943 97953 
 
B. Evaluation Metrics 
We used two indicators [9, 16] to evaluate the experimental 
results: The detection rate in formula (8) is defined as the 
number of checked attack profiles divided by the number of the 
total attack profiles. The false alarm rate in formula (9) is 
defined as the number of normal profiles that are recognized as 
abnormal profiles divided by the number of all normal profiles. 
𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
         (8)            
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
                  (9)  
C. Comparative Approaches 
At present, there are many methods [12,13,17] for attacks 
detection, but we put forward methods based on time and item 
view, so we compare it with similar methods [9,15,16] in this 
paper. The comparison of relevant methods has Zhang et al. [15] 
and Gao et al. [9,16] in the simulation experiment on the 
MovieLens 100k dataset. The following are brief introduction to 
three methods of them: 
DP [9]: According to two features of shilling attacks (item 
abnormality: the rating of item is always maximum and 
minimum as well as attack promptness: it takes a very short 
period time to inject attacks), this method first dynamically 
partitions item-rating time series based on important points, and 
then, use chi square distribution to detect abnormal intervals. 
Algorithm 2: T-distribution identifies attack windows 
Input: the rating history of item: 𝐻, all time windows of 
 𝐻: 𝑤1,…,𝑤𝑖 ,…,𝑤𝑚,  𝑤𝑖{ℎ1, …, ℎ𝑘}, the size of 𝑤𝑖: 𝑤𝑠𝑖 , 
the number of rating kind of 𝑤𝑖: 𝑟𝑘𝑖 , the timestamp 
difference of 𝑤𝑖: 𝑤𝑑𝑖  
Output: the abnormal time windows 𝐴𝑊 
1: 𝑎0= mean of 𝐻. 𝑟 
2: for 𝑖 from 0 to 𝑚: 
3:    for 𝑗 from 0 to 𝑚: 
4:       calculate means and variances of 𝑤𝑖 .𝑟 and 𝑤𝑗 . 𝑟 
5:       get 𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗, 𝑠𝑖
2 and  𝑠𝑗
2  
6:       𝑎𝑖= mean of 𝐻. 𝑟 without 𝑤𝑖  
7:       if (𝑖! = 𝑗): 
8:           𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗, 𝑠𝑖
2, 𝑠𝑗
2, 𝑎0, 𝑎𝑖, 𝑟𝑘𝑖 , 𝑟𝑘𝑗, 𝑤𝑠𝑖 , 𝑤𝑠𝑗  calculate 𝑡𝑖𝑗 
9:           𝑟𝑘𝑖 , 𝑟𝑘𝑗 calculate freedom 
10:         compare boundary 
11: get matrix 𝑇(0 − 1) 
12: for 𝑖 from 0 to 𝑚: 
13:     𝑧𝑖= 𝑇𝑖 . 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(1) − 𝑇𝑗 . 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(0) 
14: for 𝑖 from 0 to 𝑚: 
15:     if (𝑧𝑖 >= 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑧) and 𝑤𝑑𝑖<=𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑤𝑑) and    
                                   𝑤𝑠𝑖>=𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑤𝑠)): 
16:     AW. append(𝑤𝑖) 
17: get 𝐴𝑊      
TIC [16]: The distributions of ratings in different time 
intervals are compared to detect anomaly intervals based on the 
calculation of chi square distribution (𝜒2). 
TS [15]: The method constructs a time series of rating for an 
item to compute the features of sample average and sample in 
each window, and based on duration of attacks, observing the 
time series of two features can expose attack events, in which 
sample average is represented by TS-Ave and sample entropy is 
represented by TS-Ent. 
D. Experiment Performance 
To evaluate the performance of our method in different 
attack quantities, filler sizes, items of feature and attack models, 
we use MovieLens dataset to take four types ratings: fad, fashion, 
style, and scallop as well as three attack models: average attack, 
random attack, and bandwagon attack. Supposing that original 
users are normal users, and attackers are those generated from 
attack models. The number of attack is 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 and 
filler size is set to 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, 10%, which divided into 
two categories experience: push and nuke. Based on the 
characteristics of shilling attack in section (attacks are very 
dense and injection periods are tiny time intervals in the rating 
history), we set the time gap between attacks in the same period 
within 1000 seconds. 50 items are randomly selected from 1152 
items. We repeat the experiments fifty times.  
This section is mainly divided into three parts to show. 
Firstly, we introduce the effect of threshold values on the 
experiment. Secondly, we show the impact of our method 
compared with other similar experiments. Thirdly, we 
demonstrate effect of our method to detect four styles of 
characteristic ratings and three kinds of attack models.  
1) Impact of threshold setting in experimentg: DTI has two 
thresholds to be determined in the experiment. One is the 𝛼 
value that controls the end action of DTI. And the other is the 
𝛽 value that affects the time efficiency of the experiment. 
The selection of 𝛼  value is related to the four type 
characteristics ratings. We obtain the value by experiment, and 
50 push attacks (filler size is 0) are injected into the system and 
testing, without thinking about 𝛽  ( 𝛽  is 0). According to 
literature [16], 1,152 items are divided into four types based on 
the characteristics of the rating quantity and the rating time, fad, 
fashion, style, scallop, respectively. The following are the 
characteristics of four types: 
• Fad: There are 75 items in total. It is characterized by 
relatively dense rating time and fewer rating quantities. 
• Fashion: There are 41 items in total. The rating feature is 
that the rating time is relatively concentrated and the 
number of ratings is larger. 
• Style: There are 250 items in total. It is characterized by 
scattered rating time and smaller number of rating. 
• Scallop: There are 786 items in total. The rating feature 
is that there is always a topic and the rating quantity is 
relatively larger. 
Fig. 6 shows the effects of threshold α changes on DTI 
procedure. As shown from Fig. 6, horizontal coordinate is the 
false alarm rate and vertical coordinate is the detection rate, 
where one 𝛼 value corresponds to a detection rate and a false 
detection rate. Through the increasing change of 𝛼 value from 0, 
the broken line graph is drawn, and unit of 𝛼 is hour (h).  In the 
experiment, we expect the detection rate to be as large as 
possible and the false alarm rate as small as possible. The most 
ideal state is that 𝛼 exists one value, which makes the detection 
rate is reach 1, and the false alarm rate is 0. That is to say, we 
need the closest point to the point (0,1). Fig. 6-(a), Fig. 6-(b), 
Fig. 6-(c) and Fig. 6-(d) are respectively experimental results of 
fad, fashion, style and scallop kinds of items and we've circled 
the closest points in red and acquire the ranges of the 
corresponding 𝛼 optimal value  to structure in table VI, where 
we list the range of 𝛼 and the corresponding range of detection 
rate and false alarm rate in four kinds of items. By integrating 
the intersecting parts of the four categories items, we get the best 
experimental results for four kinds of items when the α value is 
equal to 0.389h, as shown in the synthesize column in table VI. 
𝛽 value is related to the number of attacks injected in the 
system. According to a large number of experiments, when 𝛽 is 
set to 10, the experimental result is the best, and the running time 
of DTI reach the optimal value. 
2) Comparison with Other Approachess: All compared 
methods involved Zhang et al.[15] and Gao et al.[9,16] are 
based on the simulation experiments on the MovieLens 100k 
data set. Since the attack model is not affected in this paper and 
three article [9, 15, 16], the filler size  isn’t considered here. The 
experimental results are shown in Fig. 7. 
For detection rate: the experiment results of push attack are 
shown in Fig. 7-(a).The curve of our method (TDTI) is similar 
to Gao's method (DP), because they all started with the idea of 
dynamic partitioning time series. When attack size is 10, the 
detection rate of TDTI gets to 0.965 and DP is 0.75. When more  
 
   
(a) Impact of α on fad items (b) Impact of α on scallop items (c) Impact of α on style items (d) Impact of α on scallop items 
Fig. 6. Impact of α(h) on detection and false alarm among the four kinds of items: fad, fashion, style, scallop 
than 20, TDTI maintains steady state, slowly rising from 0.99 to 
0.992, and the DP is also rising from 0.93 to 0.96. It is obvious 
from the data that our method is more accurate, because DTI 
method can more accurately dividing the attack profile at a time 
window than Gao's method, and for the detection of unusual 
window, we make full use of the characteristic of T-distribution 
where small sample detection effect is obvious. Zhang's method 
(TS-Ent) has a very bad rate that is 0.72 when attack size is 10. 
TIC doesn’t have obviously better effect than the DP and TDTI 
methods. 
Fig. 7-(b) shows the experiment effect of nuke attack. When 
Attack size at 10, TDTI is 0.905, and Zhang's method (TS-Ave) 
is 0.98, which is 0.075 higher than ours. However, the curve of 
sample average declines linearly, When the attack size is 50, the 
detection rate of his method is 0.59. This is that the method used 
by Zhang is static window, so the larger the attack is, the more 
easily the attack is divided into multiple windows, resulting in 
decreasing of detection rate. TDTI curve is relatively stable, 
when attack size is 50, the detection rate was 0.97.  
For false alarm rate: as shown in Fig. 7-(c) and Fig. 7-(d), 
the rate of Gao’s method is very high, while Zhang's method is 
very low. The rate of our method (TDTI) is above Zhang's 
method and below the Gao’s method, and the trend is relatively 
stable in the below 0.028. This illustrates that T-distribution 
method has an obvious identification effect on determining the 
similarity between windows. 
Through the comparison between methods in the experiment, 
our method has a satisfactory effect, which is because we clearly 
know the common characteristics of the shilling attack, and put 
forward the detection method according to its characteristics and 
existing conditions. 
 
3) Comparison of between rating features and between 
attack models: We detect the effect of our method in the four 
kinds of items that fad, fashion, style and scallop, and in the 
three kinds of common attack models which including random 
attack, average attack and bandwagon attack. As well as we 
observe the change of detecting results by changing the attack 
size and filler size.  
The following Fig. 8 is the evaluation of the detection rate of 
the four types items, in the average attack condition that the 
injection attack size is 10 and the filler size is 5%. The detection 
rate of push attacks are generally higher than nuke attacks. When 
the attack size is 10, the difference between push and nuke is the 
largest, where the detection rate of fad item injecting push 
attacks is 0.99 and nuke is 0.91, which is 0.07 higher. The best 
experiment effect of four types is fad, whose push attack gets to 
0.99 as well as nuke attack is more than 0.91, and the highest is 
up to 0.98. This is because the fad rating features are time-
intensive and less quantity, which makes it easier for our method 
to divide normal profiles into a time window and attack profiles 
into a time window, through the T-distribution method can more 
accurately compare the similarity of normal and abnormal 
window. Among them, scallop has the worst effect compared 
TABLE VI.  𝛼 OPTIMAL VALUE IN DIFFERENT KINGDS OF ITEM  (𝛼 UNIT:  H ) 
kinds of item fad fashion style scallop synthesize 
α 0.278-0.389 0.389-0.444 0.278-2.78 0.278-0.389 0.389 
detection rate 1 0.82-0.84 1 0.96-0.97 0.979 
false alarm rate 0.0708-0.072 0.023-0.025 0.062-0.063 0.015 0.028 
    
(a) detection rate for push attacks (b) detection rate for nuke attacks (c) false alarm rate for push attacks (d) false alarm rate for nuke attacks 
Fig. 7. Detection rates and false alarm rate on MovieLens 100k data set 
    
  (a) fad and fashion kinds of items  (b) style and scallop kinds of items   (a) push attacks        (b) nuke attacks 
Fig. 8. Impact of attack size on four kinds of items Fig. 9. Impact of filler size on attack model 
 
with the other three types. The reason for the low detection rate 
is that scallop has ratings in each time period and the number of 
ratings is large, which makes it difficult to divide attack profiles 
into a time window where there are less normal profiles. In the 
experiment, there is little difference in false alarm rate between 
the four rating types, as they have the same condition that filler 
size is 10%.  
Fig. 9 is to test the influence of the filling size on each attack 
model. Experimental conditions: the attack size is 10, and the 
selected item in the Bandwagon attack is 50th, because the item 
always has the topic degree and its rating quantity is largest in 
the 1682 items.  
As shown in the Fig. 9, the false alarm rate of the three types 
is below 0.028, and the lowest is 0.012. The false alarm rate of 
the attack model did not increase with the increasing filling size. 
The highest of these is the average attack. Random attack and 
popular attack are stable. Since many articles [9,15,16] have 
demonstrated that the detection methods based on item are not 
greatly affected by the attack model, we no longer consider the 
influence of the attack model on the detection rate. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the characteristics of the shilling attacks, this paper 
proposes the DTI algorithm to divide the rating history into 
multiple time windows, and then the T-distribution algorithm 
calculate the similarity between windows, and finally, system 
identifies shilling attacks by analyzing the time difference and 
profile quantity of each window.  
Compared to other methods, detection rate of our method 
achieves the desired value, but our false alarm rate still needs to 
be improved. Therefore, we should continue to work hard in 
order to reduce the false alarm rate. Our future work is striving 
to make better results.  
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